CVE-2026-63979

Published: July 22, 2026Last modified: July 22, 2026

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced.

Severity score breakdown

ParameterValue
Base score9.8
Attack VectorNETWORK
Attack complexityLOW
Privileges requiredNONE
User interactionNONE
ScopeUNCHANGED
ConfidentialityHIGH
Integrity impactHIGH
Availability impactHIGH
VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Status

ProductReleasePackageStatus
Alpaquita Linux23 LTSlinux-ltsNot affected (6.1.33-r0)
25 LTSlinux-ltsVulnerable (6.12.95-r0)
Streamlinux-ltsVulnerable (6.18.38-r0)

References

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