CVE-2026-53267

Published: June 27, 2026Last modified: July 6, 2026

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1]. A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug: table ip t { chain pre { type filter hook prerouting priority raw; ct zone set 1 ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept } } The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers. Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(), mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally, bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than by an untrusted field on the conntrack. [1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c

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References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e154b5f53f1b0b490c7b8b02499f90feb86b1d5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3027ecbdb5fdf9200251c21d4818e4c447ef78e1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8470f676eadeab99132708acb1a85915664d6115
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af80f78ce984649e1698b841cd33f4fa505ad828
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f071b0bf078146368d18e4eec386bf2ddc0ab7e0